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ABSTRACT: 
This Master´s thesis examines whether value and momentum strategies have been 
profitable in the Nordic stock markets from 1993 to 2017 and if combining the value and 
momentum can improve the pure-play strategies. Additionally, and most importantly, 
it is researched whether combining value and momentum into a more sophisticated 
combination portfolio can improve the results even further.  
By using Nordic data and a new time period, additional contribution is added to the 
existing research. Additionally, the combination of momentum and value is studied in a 
more detailed portfolio implementation manner than in Asness et al. (2013). Similar 
portfolio creation methods are used as in Fisher et al. (2016) but additionally long-short 
portfolios are examined.  
The results indicate that value and momentum anomalies existed in the Nordic stock 
markets during the time period, although value is driven mostly by the smaller stocks. 
Simple 50/50 allocation improves portfolio performance significantly which is further 
improved by combining value and momentum into a more sophisticated combination 
portfolio. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
KEY WORDS: value, momentum, portfolio implementation 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
The chase for higher returns on investments is one of the most discussed and 
debated topics in the field of finance. Finance theory tells us that it is not possible 
to get higher returns without taking a higher risk. The correlation between risk 
and return is described with the capital asset pricing model, known as CAPM. 
(Bodie et al. 2011a: 280). The topic has been in the keen interest of practitioners as 
well as academics.  
In 1992, Fama and French researched that firm size has a negative relation to 
average return and book-to-market ratio has a positive correlation to average 
return. This is not explained by CAPM where nothing but market beta should 
affect average returns. These findings were already discovered earlier, size by 
Banz in 1981 and value anomaly has been present since the 1930s when Graham 
and Dodd introduced it (Banz 1981, Graham & Dodd, 1934). The anomalies are 
known as size and value premium. Based on their findings, Fama and French 
developed a new model where they added three proxies for risk: firm size, book-
to-market ratio and market return. The model is widely recognized in the field of 
finance and it is known as the Fama-French three-factor model. (Fama & French 
1992).  
In the academic field of finance, markets are considered efficient. Stock prices 
move randomly and this is called random walk, therefore there are no 
possibilities for greater returns without greater risk.  If we could predict stock 
prices it would be an absolute gold mine. (Bodie et al. 2011a: 343-348). Yet there 
are several anomalies that should not exist according to the efficient market 
theory. Market capitalization, book-to-market ratio or prior stock market 
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movements should have zero effect on average returns. One explanation for these 
overly large average returns is solely higher risk, the other one is mispricing. 
In the 21st century, value investing has become increasingly popular. There are 
mutual funds, ETFs and hedge funds that fixate merely on value investing. The 
principle behind this fixation is the value premium. Many financial companies 
have also funds concentrated on the momentum effect. There are even funds that 
try to combine both premiums into one product, such as AQR´s International 
multi style fund (https://funds.aqr.com/). It is easy to see why such funds have 
gained huge popularity among financial companies. Value stocks have 
outperformed growth stocks in the past, further winner stocks have beaten loser 
stocks and it can be seen as an attractive story to sell to possible investors. Then 
again, some might argue that the reason behind the popularity of growth stocks 
is their possibilities of huge returns and chances of getting on board with the new 
Microsoft or Apple on the ground floor. These kinds of stories attract investors, 
even though it has been clear that value stocks outperform growth stocks in the 
long run, although there are some studies claiming that value no longer works.  
1.2. Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze value and momentum premiums on the 
basis of prior studies and research the best possible ways to combine the two 
styles. The main idea is to find out if simple separate value or momentum 
strategies can be beaten by the 50/50 approach, where half of the portfolio is 
allocated to value investing and other half to momentum strategy, or by 
combining the two measures into one strategy. The research will attempt to find 
ideal portfolio implementation techniques that will enhance the sole value or 
momentum strategies. It is also researched which of the strategies generates the 
highest risk-adjusted returns as well as raw returns.  
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This thesis will also present some of the most popular stock pricing models and 
discuss whether they can price risk properly. One possible explanation for the 
anomalies is that current pricing models are incapable of pricing risk, and value 
and momentum just work as proxies for the risk. Another explanation is that 
these value stocks and momentum phenomena are merely mispriced because of 
the errors in investor behaviour and stock pricing models.  
There are a number of studies that have examined value and momentum 
anomalies separately but only some of them have concentrated on their 
correlation and even fewer have been focusing on combining the two measures. 
There is controversial debate on the value premium’s ability to capture risk. Some 
see it as a proxy for risk, while others feel it is based on market inefficiencies, 
such as mispricing. A third view is that the phenomenon rises because of random 
occurrences, e.g. data mining issues. Same applies to the momentum anomaly. 
There are some studies where the concentration has been on the combination of 
the anomalies. This paper will concentrate on a few of them. Most of the studies 
have been made with U.S. data, which leaves demand for further examination 
with international data to which this thesis will contribute. 
Using a liquid set of Nordic stocks provides significant contribution that 
supports previous academic research. Additionally, focusing on finding the best 
way to combine value and momentum anomalies adds to the existing research 
and contributes to practitioners in portfolio management. To my knowledge this 
the first time when the optimal combination of value and momentum is 
researched in the Nordic stock market setting. 
1.3. Previous studies 
Previous studies have suggested that value and momentum strategies earn 
abnormal risk-adjusted returns (Stattman 1980, Jegadeesh & Titman 1993). There 
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have been also studies that show negative correlation between the two strategies 
(Asness et al. 2013, Cakici et al. 2013). This paper studies the value and 
momentum anomalies and whether higher risk adjusted returns are achievable 
by combining value and momentum strategies. This is an interesting and current 
topic as investors all around the world seek a more favourable risk/reward ratio. 
There is also a lack of consensus on the subject of what causes these premiums: 
this is a massive motivator for this study. 
Most of the prior studies have concentrated on showing the existence of value 
and momentum anomalies separately. The anomalies are well recorded in many 
markets with different time periods, but yet not many have studied the anomalies 
combined. Asness et al. (2013) study these anomalies jointly and find negative 
correlation within asset classes. The presence of negative correlation in two high-
yielding strategies is exhilarating and they record substantially improved Sharpe 
ratios with a 50/50 portfolio in comparison to simple value or momentum 
strategy.  
Fisher et al. (2016) take an approach similar to this paper when studying the 
combination of value and momentum strategies. They compare the simple 50/50 
strategy to more complex combination strategies with U.S. stocks with long-only 
strategies. After accounting for transaction costs combination is discovered as a 
better strategy than the simple 50/50 approach. Both strategies beat value and 
momentum-only strategies. In this study, the aforementioned approach is 
broadened by including also long-short strategies in a new market setting. Also 
examining long-short strategies and discussing issues around them in a smaller 
but liquid market contributes to the research as well as to the practice of portfolio 
management. 
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The emphasis of the study will be in finding the best way to combine the two 
strategies into one portfolio. The emphasis will be on risk-adjusted returns, but 
raw returns are also presented. It is noteworthy that some of the diversification 
benefits that derive from negative correlation of value and momentum may be 
lost when combining them into one portfolio rather than using the 50/50 
approach. Double screening and ranking methods may end up behaving in a 
manner very similar to momentum portfolio. Using Nordic stock market data 
adds to the prior studies and the results contribute to both portfolio management 
as well as academic research. Researching Nordic markets adds to current 
research by widening the scope to a liquid and low risk environment. It is 
noteworthy that the previous studies may have had sample-specific results and 
some of the previous studies have used value-weighted returns when 
researching Nordic markets as part of their study. Value-weighted returns are 
not a viable measure in the Nordic stock market setting due to the fact that it 
leads to few or even one stock dominating the returns. This issue is further 
discussed in this thesis. 
1.4. Research question and hypothesis 
This paper studies whether momentum and value anomalies exist in the Nordic 
stock markets and if it is possible to earn higher risk adjusted returns. 
Additionally, and most importantly, it is studied whether combining the two 
measures can improve the risk-adjusted returns and portfolio performance. The 
hypotheses are as follows: 
H0: There is no correlation between P/B ratios and future stock 
returns 
H1: There is no correlation between past stock returns and future 
stock returns 
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Assuming H0 or H1 are proven false, the study will be extended to researching 
the best ways to combine the two phenomena.  
H2: 50/50 allocation between momentum and value portfolio will not 
increase risk-adjusted returns.  
H3: Combining value and momentum anomalies into one 
combination portfolio will not increase risk-adjusted returns. 
H4: Combining value and momentum anomalies into one 
combination portfolio will not increase risk-adjusted returns of 50/50 
allocation between momentum and value. 
1.5. Structure of the study 
This thesis gets acquainted with value and momentum anomalies and the factors 
behind these phenomena. A literature review will present the value and 
momentum anomalies and the explanations regarding what causes them, further 
previous studies on combining value and momentum are presented. Both risk-
based and mispricing-oriented views are presented and analyzed based on prior 
academic research. In addition, stock pricing models and portfolio performance 
measures are presented.  
The second chapter will go on to introduce efficient market theory, and thereafter 
Nordic stock markets will be discussed in the third chapter. Stock pricing models 
will be presented in the fourth chapter. In the fifth chapter, portfolio performance 
measures are presented and discussed. The sixth chapter will discuss the 
anomalies, and prior studies regarding the combination of value and momentum 
strategies are presented and analysed. Seventh chapter will present the data and 
methodology used in this paper, followed by empirical results that are reported 
in the eighth chapter. Lastly, the final chapter covers the conclusions of the study.  
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2. MARKET EFFICIENCY 
The primary role of the capital market is the allocation of the financial resources. 
Investors are able to make higher returns by lending money for investments, and 
companies are able to finance their production investments and make their 
businesses grow. Markets are also seen as an efficient environment where free 
lunches do not exist. Yet there are a huge number of actively managed funds in 
spite of their higher cost and the fact that money managers should not be able to 
find higher profit opportunities based on mispricing. (Bodie et al. 2011a, 2, 5-6, 9-
11.) Without properly functioning capital markets, our standard of living would 
not have reached such a high level as companies and individuals would not have 
the capital to invest in profitable endeavours (Smith 1776). Therefore, it is 
important to understand the factors that affect financial markets, and the theories 
behind them. Efficient markets are the corner stone of any financial theory. 
Markets also reflect information by prices. A market that completely reflects all 
the information all the time is referred as efficient. This is known as the efficient 
market hypothesis (EMH). There are three levels of efficiency, and it is tested 
firstly with weak form tests; secondly, with semi-strong form tests and lastly, 
with strong form tests. Weak form tests contain merely discussion of the 
historical prices. Semi-strong form tests take into consideration whether prices 
adjust efficiently to information that is publicly available, such as stock splits and 
announcements of the quarterly earnings. Strong form tests concern whether 
some investors have access to information that is relevant to price formation and 
that others do not have access to (Fama 1970.) Fama views that the efficient 
markets hold up well, aside from few expectations. 
The three forms of the efficient market hypothesis are presented below in Figure 
1. It shows that strong forms include semi-strong and weak forms plus all private 
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information. Semi-strong forms include all public information plus weak forms, 
and weak forms include only past prices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Three forms of the EMH 
Nowadays, there is a strong belief among some academics that the behavior of 
investors may not be rational all the time. Due to our human nature we tend to 
make errors and irrational decisions. This school of thought is known as 
behavioral finance. Behavioral finance tries to explain market inefficiencies, such 
as anomalies, through investor psychology. It has been discovered that 
overreaction, anchoring and mental accounting, to name few, affect the investors’ 
decision making. This view offers opposite explanations for anomalies to market 
efficiency. (Bodie et al. 2011a, 382-385.) 
There is some evidence supporting the view that EMH is not completely accurate. 
Lakonishok & Lee (2001) find that insider trading has the capability to anticipate 
market movements. On average, insiders are contrarian investors but they do a 
better job at predicting market movements than simple contrarian strategies. 
They also perform better in predicting movements of small companies than large 
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companies. Lakonishok et al. (2001) suggest that larger companies are priced 
more efficiently, thus the biggest potential benefits of exploiting insider trading 
can be achieved in the smaller companies. They also believe that market ignores 
the valuable information of insider trading. “There is very little action around the 
time when insiders trade” (Lakonishok et al. 2001.) When comparing stocks that 
investors buy extensively to those that they sell extensively, the bought stocks 
outperform the sold ones by 7,8% during the first year and by 2,3% in the second 
year. In third year there is no noticeable difference in returns. It is very unlikely 
that this is caused by higher risk, because of the pattern that the gap in returns 
disappears over time.  
Insiders buy and sell different types of stocks on average. They tend to buy value 
stocks that are cheap by book-to-market measures and have had weak past 
performance, whereas insiders tend to sell “glamor” stocks that have had a good 
run in the past. In addition, investors prefer buying small-cap stocks. It is also 
discovered that only insiders’ purchases are valuable information, because 
insiders selling stocks do not associate with low returns. This may be due to the 
fact that insiders have a variety of motives in selling stocks, and the main reason 
in buying them is to make money. (Lakonishok et al. 2001.) 
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3. NORDIC STOCK MARKETS 
Nordic stock markets are relatively new yet developed stock markets. The market 
consists of five countries: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Out 
of these markets, Iceland is extremely small and often not included as part of the 
Nordics as is done in this study. (www.nasdaqomxnordic.com) Foreign 
ownership of the Nordic stock markets has risen significantly from the early 90´s 
as the economies have developed and stock markets have become more active in 
pure number of stocks and trading volume as well.  
These markets are sometimes even referred to as periphery markets. Periphery 
market refers to a stock market that is on the outskirt of the investment horizon. 
Oftentimes these periphery markets are volatile as in times of distress investors 
pull their money away from these markets first. This is the other side of the flight 
to safety. Today, Nordic countries are often considered part of the European 
“core”, although the shift in foreign ownership during crises implies that they 
still experience some peripheral qualities.  
Nordic stock markets started to develop rapidly in the 90´s when the economies 
started growing at a fast pace. As a young but liquid stock market and a low risk 
environment, the Nordic stock market offers an interesting opportunity to 
broaden equity market studies outside of the traditional U.S. scope. The trading 
volumes are lower than in the U.S., but the markets are stable and the countries 
have a stable political environment with low risk profiles. For example, the bond 
yields of Nordic countries have been very close to U.S. bond yields which is not 
the case with many periphery or developing markets. The development of 
Nordic and U.S. credit rating is presented in Figure 2. It is clear that Nordic 
markets are seen somewhat riskier than the U.S. one but they are far from the risk 
levels of emerging markets. The ratings are S&P local currency long term credit 
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ratings and are gathered from Bloomberg. In addition to the Nordic and U.S. 
credit ratings, BRIC-countriey ratings are presented to give a visible evidence on 
the differences on risk levels.  
 
Figure 2. Nordic and U.S. credit rating development from 1993 to 2018 
Nordic countries have held constantly a triple-A credit rating with the exception 
of Finland which is currently rated at the same level as the U.S. Some might even 
argue that the Nordic stock markets are less risky from this standpoint than the 
U.S. one, hence the U.S. has also been downgraded to the double-A while 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden hold triple-A rating. The Nordic countries are 
also low in corruption and the stock markets have a healthy level of liquidity.  
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AA + 
AA 
A 
A- 
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BBB 
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B 
B-  
19 
 
 
 
In previous research, there has not been a lot of focus on the Nordic stock 
markets, and some of the studies that have researched a wide range of 
international markets have used market-weighted returns which is not viable in 
a smaller market setting with few very large stocks. In addition, a rapidly 
growing stock market with a lot of new stocks emerging, increasing liquidity, 
high level of exporting products and services of GDP, but low risk levels offer a 
fertile ground to study stock market anomalies. Furthermore, it should be noted 
that many funds tend to have home market bias and it is as valuable to create 
alpha in any market.    
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4. STOCK PRICING MODELS 
In financial markets, there is ongoing process to find and exploit mispriced 
securities. Even minor mispricing gives investors opportunities to beat the 
market and earn excess returns. This is why there is an army of analysts, money 
managers and individual investors searching for even the smallest error between 
the company’s “true” value and its market value. In order to determine the “true” 
value of a company and uncover mispricing securities, analysts and investors use 
different valuation models. (Bodie et al. 2011b: 763.) This chapter presents a few 
of the most commonly used valuation methods and provides the basis for later 
critique.  
4.1. Capital asset pricing model 
The capital asset pricing model, usually referred to as the CAPM, is a centerpiece 
of modern financial economics. The model provides us with a decisive prediction 
of the relationship between the risk and expected return of an asset. The model 
was developed simultaneously but independently by William Sharpe (1964), 
John Lintner (1965) and Jan Mossin (1966). Their work was laid on the 
foundations of Harry Markovic who developed the modern portfolio 
management in 1952. The formula for CAPM presents as follows (Bodie et al. 
2011b: 308, 321): 
 
(1) 𝐸(𝑅𝑖) =  𝑅𝑓 +  𝛽𝑖[𝐸(𝑅𝑚) − 𝑅𝑓] 
 
where E(𝑅𝑖)  = expected return of portfolio i 
 𝑅𝑓 = risk-free return 
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 𝛽𝑖  = the beta coefficient of the portfolio i 
 E(𝑅𝑚)  = expected return of market portfolio  
 
There is a number of simplifying assumptions that lead to the basic version of the 
CAPM. These assumptions are unrealistic but they provide us with a platform 
from where we can pursue the goal of completely understanding risk-return 
relationship. The assumptions are as follows (Bodie et al. 2011b: 308-309): 
1. There are numerous investors whose wealth is small compared to the total 
endowment of all investors. Therefore, investors are price-takers whose 
actions do not affect the prices. Thus perfect competition prevails. 
2. All investors have the same holding period.  
3. Investments are limited to publicly traded financial assets, such as bonds 
and stocks, and to risk-free lending and borrowing. Investors can lend or 
borrow any amount at risk-free rate. 
4. Investors pay no transaction cost or taxes. 
5. All investors are rational mean-variance optimizers, thus using 
Markowitz´s portfolio selection model. 
6. All investors have homogenous expectations and beliefs.   
The correlation between expected return and beta is expressed below graphically. 
The line, which contains every possible scenario between beta and expected 
return, is known as security market line (SML). It can be viewed from the graph 
that return of a security contains two parts: risk-free return ( 𝑅𝑓 ) and risk 
premium. In this graph, the expected return of the investment (𝐸(𝑅𝑖)) is higher 
than expected market return (E(𝑅𝑚)) because of its greater beta. The slope of the 
security market line is the markets risk premium. “Correctly” priced stock lies in 
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the SML, however there may occur mispricing and therefore stock may not be on 
the SML. If stock is above the SML it is considered to be under-priced and 
conversely over-priced stock lies below the security market line. (Bodie et al. 
2011b:317-320.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The Security market line (Bodie et al. 2011b: 319) 
4.2. Three-factor model 
In order to capture risk premiums better than with CAPM Fama and French 
developed the three-factor model. The variables are based on prior evidence and 
predict well average returns. There are two easily measured variables in addition 
to the beta, Small Minus Big and High Minus Low. Small Minus Big, often 
referred to as SMB, is a factor that tries to capture the size premium and, 
according to Fama and French, it works as a proxy for risk. High Minus Low, 
otherwise known as HML, is a proxy for risk that value stocks carry. The smaller 
the company and the greater its book-to-market ratio, the riskier it is. Thus small 
companies with high book-to-market ratios should earn higher returns than the 
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market on average. (Fama & French, 1992, 1996). The Fama-French three-factor 
model is dominating industry applications and empirical research. The formula 
of the three-factor model is presented as follows (Bodie et al. 2011b: 363):  
 
The expected excess return on portfolio i is: 
(2) 𝐸(𝑅𝑖) − 𝑅𝑓 =  𝑏𝑖[𝐸(𝑅𝑚) − 𝑅𝑓] + 𝑠𝑖𝐸(𝑆𝑀𝐵) + ℎ𝑖𝐸(𝐻𝑀𝐿) 
 
where: 𝐸(𝑅𝑖) − 𝑅𝑓 = expected market return premium 
 E(SMB) = expected size premium 
 E(HML) = expected premium on high book-to-market stocks 
 𝑏𝑖 = factor loading market return premium 
 𝑠𝑖 = factor loading on size premium 
 ℎ𝑖 = factor loading on high book-to-market stocks 
 
4.3. Carhart four-factor model 
In 1997, Carhart studied the performance of mutual fund managers and found 
that their performance does not represent superior stock-picking skills, but rather 
it is based on few common factors that current stock pricing models do not take 
into account.  Based on the findings, the Carhart four-factor model was 
developed to better capture the risk-adjusted returns. In addition to Fama and 
French’s three-factor, Carhart (1997) suggests adding the momentum spread as a 
fourth risk factor. The fourth factor is called winners-minus-losers (WML) and 
captures the risk-related to momentum anomaly. 
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The expected excess return on portfolio i is: 
(3) 𝐸(𝑅𝑖) − 𝑅𝑓 =  𝑏𝑖[𝐸(𝑅𝑚) − 𝑅𝑓] + 𝑠𝑖𝐸(𝑆𝑀𝐵) + ℎ𝑖𝐸(𝐻𝑀𝐿) + 𝑚𝑖𝐸(𝑊𝑀𝐿) 
 
where: 𝐸(𝑅𝑖) − 𝑅𝑓 = expected market return premium 
 E(SMB) = expected size premium 
 E(HML) = expected premium on high book-to-market stocks 
 E(WML) = expected premium on momentum stocks 
 𝑏𝑖 = factor loading market return premium 
 𝑠𝑖 = factor loading on size premium 
 ℎ𝑖 = factor loading on high book-to-market stocks 
 𝑚𝑖 = factor loading on momentum stocks  
 
4.4. Fama and French five-factor model 
In a more recent paper, Fama and French (2015) proposed a five-factor model. It 
better captures higher excess returns related to anomalies when adjusting for risk 
compared to previous models. It adds two factors, profitability (RMW) and 
investment (CMA), to their previous three-factor model. Profitability is the 
difference of returns between high and low profitability companies and 
investment is the difference between low and high investment firms. CMA is 
described as conservative minus aggressive and RMW is described robust minus 
weak.  They find that “positive exposures to RMW and CMA capture the high 
average returns associated with low market β, share repurchases, and low stock 
return volatility”. (Fama & French 2015, 2016) 
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The expected excess return on portfolio i is: 
(4) 𝐸(𝑅𝑖) − 𝑅𝑓 =  𝑏𝑖[𝐸(𝑅𝑚) − 𝑅𝑓] + 𝑠𝑖𝐸(𝑆𝑀𝐵) + ℎ𝑖𝐸(𝐻𝑀𝐿) + 𝑟𝑖𝐸(𝑅𝑀𝑊) +
𝑐𝑖𝐸(𝐶𝐹𝐴)  
 
where: 𝐸(𝑅𝑖) − 𝑅𝑓 = expected market return premium 
 E(SMB) = expected size premium 
 E(HML) = expected premium on high book-to-market stocks 
 𝑏𝑖 = factor loading market return premium 
 𝑠𝑖 = factor loading on size premium 
 ℎ𝑖 = factor loading on high book-to-market stocks 
 𝑟𝑖 = factor loading on high profitability stocks 
 𝑐𝑖 = factor loading on low investment stocks 
 
4.5. Dividend discount model 
Dividend discount model (DDM) is a stock valuation model created to uncover 
the stocks’ intrinsic value. The model is based on the company’s future 
dividends. The intrinsic value of the share is its dividend’s present value into 
perpetuity. The idea was first presented by John Burr Williams in 1938. It is 
important to notice that the variables used to calculate intrinsic value are 
estimated dividends. If we predict the forecast of the growth in dividends wrong 
it has a major impact to the result, because majority of the intrinsic value is driven 
by future dividends. The formula for dividend discount model or DDM goes as 
follows: (Bodie et al. 2011b: 767-768; Berk et al. 2015: 226-237.)  
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(5) 𝑃0 =  
𝐷1
1+𝑘
+
𝐷2
(1+𝑘)2
+ ⋯ +
𝐷𝑡
(1+𝑘)𝑡
 
 
where: 𝑃0 = current share price 
 𝐷𝑡 = dividend at time t 
 k   = required rate of return 
 
The model presented above is not very practical because it treats all future 
dividends as separate. Based on the previous model, a constant-growth DDM, or 
the Gordon model, named after Myron J. Gordon, was developed. Constant-
growth DDM simplifies the valuation process because we do not need dividend 
forecast for every year into the indefinite future. Instead, an estimate for the 
dividend growth is used. The formula for constant-growth DDM presents as 
follows (Bodie et al. 2011b: 768-771; Gordon & Shapiro 1956): 
(6) 𝑃0 =
𝐷1
𝑘−𝑔
 
 
where g = estimated growth rate of dividends 
 
From the formula, it can be seen that the growth rate of dividends (g) must be 
smaller than the required rate of return (k), otherwise the current value of the 
share would be infinite. The stock’s valuation will be higher the higher the 
growth rate (g) is, the lower the required rate of return (k) is and the higher the 
first year’s dividend is. (Bodie et al. 2011b: 768-771; Gordon & Shapiro 1956.) It 
can be viewed from the formula that getting the expected growth rate wrong has 
substantial impacts to the valuation. DDM and Gordon model assume no 
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differences on expected return due to P/B ratio, past price movements or firm 
profitability. 
4.6. Free cash flow model 
An alternative approach to dividend-based models is using the firm’s free cash 
flow to determine its intrinsic value. This approach is valuable when estimating 
the value of a firm that does not pay dividends, for which using DDM is not 
possible. With this model, the firm’s valuation is based on the current value of 
the firm’s free cash into perpetuity. (Bodie et al. 2011b: 789-792.) The free cash 
flow is discounted using weighted average cost of capital (WACC). The formula 
for WACC is presented below in equation 6. (Allen et al. 2014: 221) 
 
(7) 𝐹𝐶𝐹 = 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇(1 − 𝑡𝑐) + 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 −
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑁𝑊𝐶 
 
where FCF = free cash flow 
EBIT  = earnings before interest and taxes 
 𝑡𝑐 = the corporate tax rate 
 NWC  = net working capital 
 
(8) 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 =  𝑟𝐷(1 − 𝑡𝑐)
𝐷
𝐷+𝐸
+ 𝑟𝐸
𝐸
𝐷+𝐸
 
 
where 𝑟𝐷 = cost of debt 
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 𝑟𝐸 = cost of equity 
 D  = market value of debt 
 E  = market value of equity 
 
After calculating free cash flows and WACC, we may evaluate the present value 
of a company. Formula 7 shows how one may calculate a stock’s present value 
using year by year forecasts. In formula 8 it is shown how it is possible to 
calculate the present value using estimated growth rate for free cash flow. This 
eases the valuation process for analysts and investors. (Bodie et al. 2011b: 789-
792; Allen et al. 2014: 486-487.) 
 
(9) 𝑃0 =  
𝐹𝐶𝐹1
1+𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶
+
𝐹𝐶𝐹2
(1+𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)2
+ ⋯ +
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡
(1+𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)𝑡
  
 
(10) 𝑃0 =  
𝐹𝐶𝐹1
(𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶−𝑔)𝑡
 
 
where 𝑃0  = present value of the company 
 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡  = free cash at time t 
 WACC  = weighted average cost of capital 
 g  = growth rate of the cash flows   
 
It is worthy to acknowledge that even minor changes in assumptions change the 
value considerably. Therefore, it is vital not to become mesmerized by numbers 
and just complete the valuation just mechanically, while also addressing a 
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strategic view. (Allen et al. 2014: 486-487.) It is possible that investors make errors 
in valuing companies because they estimate future earnings and growth rates 
wrong. DCF-model is probably the most used valuation model with investors, 
analysts and fund managers. It is noteworthy that it does not consider whether a 
company has a low book ratio or if it has been gaining in share price recently, but 
rather assumes that investors are able to estimate future cash flows accurately 
and account for risk via WACC. 
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5. PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
In this chapter, the most well-known portfolio performance measures are 
discussed. These measures are widely used in and/or academic research as in the 
field of portfolio management.   
5.1. Sharpe ratio 
In 1966, William Sharpe created a measure to compare the performance of 
different investment portfolios and revised the measure in 1994. Today, it is 
widely used in academic studies as well as in practice. For example, most of the 
mutual funds report their Sharpe ratios as indicators of past performance. As 
performance Sharpe ratio uses excess return and divides it with standard 
deviation to adjust for risk. The formula goes as follows (Sharpe 1966, 1994): 
 
(11) 𝑆𝛼 =
𝐸(𝑅𝛼)−𝑅𝑓
𝜎𝛼
 
 
Where: 𝑆𝛼 = Sharpe ratio 
 𝐸(𝑅𝛼) − 𝑅𝑓 = excess return over risk-free rate 
 𝜎𝛼 = standard deviation of the excess return 
 
5.2. Sortino ratio 
Sharpe ratio has been criticized because it penalizes assets for high returns due 
to the fact that rising asset prices increase standard deviation. From this stand 
point Sortino developed a measure in 1994 that would account only for the 
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downside risk. This measure is called the Sortino ratio whose formula is 
presented below (Sortino 1994): 
 
(12) 𝑆 =
𝐸(𝑅𝛼)−𝑅𝑓
𝜎𝑛
 
 
Where: S = Sortino ratio 
 𝐸(𝑅𝛼) − 𝑅𝑓 = excess return over risk-free rate 
 𝜎𝑛 = standard deviation of the negative returns 
 
5.3. Jensen´s alpha 
In 1968, Michael Jensen developed a model to measure portfolio performance. 
The model is based on the CAPM-model and it expects riskier assets to earn 
higher returns than low risk assets. The risk is measured by beta as in the CAPM-
model. The formula for Jensen´s alpha is as follows (Jensen 1968):  
 
(13) 𝛼 = 𝑅𝑖 – [𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖 * (𝑅𝑚 - 𝑅𝑓 )] 
 
Where: 𝛼 = Jensen´s alpha 
 𝑅𝑖 = return of portfolio i 
 𝛽𝑖 = beta of portfolio i 
 𝑅𝑚 = return of market portfolio 
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 𝑅𝑓  = risk-free return  
 
If the portfolio is able to create alpha it creates excess returns that are not captured 
by CAPM. This may be due to CAPM ineptitude or actual excess returns 
generated by portfolio manager.  
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6. ANOMALIES 
Based on the theory of efficient markets, it should not be possible to earn higher 
returns by using publicly available data, such as book-to-market ratio, market 
capitalization or past prices. Yet smaller firms have had higher returns than 
bigger firms and higher book-to-market companies have exceeded the returns of 
low book-to-market firms and previous share price development has had 
positive correlation to future returns. These excess returns cannot be explained 
by CAPM which is the most commonly used model in measuring risk-reward 
ratio. Therefore, these phenomena are called anomalies. (Bodie et al. 2011a, 360.) 
There are several explanations for size, momentum and value anomalies, the 
most common ones being risk-based explanations that argue small value stocks 
being riskier than larger growth stocks, and mispricing arguments that 
concentrate on the irrational acts of investors, and behavioral finance. There is 
not a clear consensus on whether size, momentum and value premiums are based 
merely on greater risk or irrational acts of investors, such as anchoring, herd 
behaviour and overconfidence. (Bodie et al. 2011a, 360-361.) 
One explanation for anomalies is mispricing. This would mean that the market 
systematically misprices stocks according to the book-to-market ratio. Another 
possible explanation is that high book-to-market companies carry more risk than 
low book-to-market firms and therefore have higher returns. (Bodie et al. 2011a, 
361.) The size, value and momentum anomalies as well as previous studies in 
value and momentum combinations are presented hereafter.  
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6.1. Firm size anomaly 
Banz (1981) discovered that small firms have higher risk-adjusted returns than 
large firms. This phenomenon is widely known as the size effect or small firm 
effect. In his study, Banz (1981) used NYSE common stocks that were listed for at 
least five years between 1926 and 1975. After forming different portfolios and 
comparing their risk-adjusted returns, he found out that there was a significant 
negative relationship between a firm’s market value and average return. The 
stocks of the firms with smaller market values had greater returns than the stocks 
of the larger companies with equal betas. This is evidence for the misspecification 
of the capital asset pricing model because the size effect has existed for at least 
four decades. In 1983, Basu discovered similar findings and also came to the 
conclusion that CAPM is misspecified. 
Fama & French (1992) also discovered that small firms have higher returns that 
CAPM could not explain. They came to the conclusion that size is proxy for risk, 
which CAPM could not explain. Therefore Fama & French created the three-
factor model where size is one of the factors that proxy for risk. They did not see 
size anomaly as a result of mispricing. Berk (1995) argues that size is not an 
anomaly at all. He detects that firm size only measures risk and does not have 
the characteristics of an anomaly.  
In line with the distress explanation, Chan and Chen (1991) present that small 
firms are riskier investments, because they are so called marginal firms. Marginal 
firms are companies that have become small because of their weak past 
performance and are likely to experience cash flow problems and high financial 
leverage. They suggest that smaller firms are less efficiently run and are also less 
efficient in their production. These factors may also result in worse accessibility 
to external finance. 
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More recently there has been research claiming that size effect has diminished or 
even vanished.  There is empirical evidence that the size effect has disappeared 
in the early 80s in the U.S. (Hirshleifer 2001, Amihud 2002). Contrarily, van Dijk 
(2011) argues that size is not dead even though there have been studies claiming 
so in the past years. He found that size effect has been large and positive during 
the last years in the U.S. stock markets. Additionally, he points out that further 
empirical research is needed in both U.S. and international market settings.  
In this study, the smallest companies are excluded from the sample in order to 
avoid creating a bias towards size anomaly. There are a lot of very small stocks 
in the Nordic stock markets, some even below 10 million euros in market 
capitalization. The procedure to eliminate size bias is discussed in chapter 7. 
6.2. Value anomaly 
The basic idea behind value investing has been around for decades. Its roots go 
as far as the 1930s when Benjamin Graham and David Dodd introduced the 
strategy to the wider audience. Value investors aim to buy cheap companies that 
are priced for one reason or another below their intrinsic value. Graham and 
Dodd suggest that investors in general overestimate the growth rates of growth 
companies leading to overpricing them and underpricing value companies. 
(Graham & Dodd, 1934). 
Book-to-market anomaly has attracted investors and academics ever since it was 
first discovered by Stattman (1980) who found out that stocks with higher book 
value to market price outperform stocks with low book value to market price 
ratio. Similar findings were made in 1985 by Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein. 
Rosenberg et al. (1985) suggest that because there is such inefficiency at the 
market there are still larger potential profits to be achieved.  
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Value premium is particularly interesting because common sense dictates that 
growth options are riskier than assets already in place. Contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, Zhang (2005) points out that growth options are actually 
less risky than assets in place, especially during economic turmoil the price risk 
is high for the assets in place. Firm value can be easily melted by unproductive 
capital and cutting capital is more expensive than expanding it. He sees the value 
premium as “a proxy for a state variable associated with relative financial 
distress”.  
Contrarily to Zhang (2005), Griffin and Lemmon (2002) find that distress risk 
does not explain value anomaly. They discovered that among the firms with the 
highest risk of distress high book-to-market companies had twice as large returns 
compared to low book-to-market companies. This large difference cannot be 
explained by the three-factor model. Same results were detected by using both 
O-score and Z-score as proxies for distress risk. The most striking finding is the 
extremely low stock returns of the low book-to-market firms in the highest O-
score group. This group’s size-adjusted return is 6,36 on average, which is even 
slightly lower than the risk-free rate of return over the sample period. The 
research was done with U.S. data from 1965 to 1996. 
In a more recent paper, Avramov et al. (2012) found that most of the profits from 
value strategies derive from stocks that carry high credit risk but bypass the 
distressed situation. The study was done with all U.S. listed firms from 1985 to 
2008. They also found that many other anomalies can be explained by distress 
risk, accruals anomaly being an exception.  
The most well-known research examining the book-to-market anomaly is Fama 
and French’s (1992) report “The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns”. In 
their study, Fama & French propose that two easily measured variables, book-to-
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market and size, provide a powerful and simple explanation of the cross-section 
of average stock returns for the 1963-1990 period. Because of the higher returns 
on high book-to-market and small companies, Fama & French suggest that book-
to-market and size are proxies for risk. However, they admit that overreaction 
could be a possible explanation for the value premium. They assert that their 
findings have practical implications for portfolio formation and performance 
evaluation for long-term investors. Fama & French carried out their initial study 
with U.S. data, but the value premium exists also internationally. (Fama & French 
1998.) 
Again, Fama & French (1992) grant the possibility that value premium is just 
regression towards mean. This would mean that markets are irrational about 
pricing the prospects of companies. The fact that value stocks have outperformed 
growth stocks could arise from the fact that investors and analysts overestimate 
the growth potential and are overly cautious about the prospects of value 
companies. If this is the case, book-to-market anomaly is not based purely on 
higher risk but rather on mispricing. 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue that value stocks outperform 
growth stocks because investors consistently overestimate the growth rate of 
“glamour stocks”. They state that value stocks have been under-priced relative 
to their risk and therefore investing in such stocks have earned excess returns. 
Despite the fact that value strategies have outperformed growth strategies 
investors tend to favor glamorous growth strategies. This springs from a variety 
of reasons. Firstly, investors extrapolate past growth rates of glamour stocks like 
Amazon, even though such high growth rates are highly unlikely to persist in the 
future. Conversely, investors are excessively pessimistic about the future 
performance of the firms that have performed poorly in the past. 
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Secondly, investors like to invest in good and well-run companies regardless of 
the price. This might lead to investors equating well-run firms with good 
investments. They also claim that institutional investors prefer investing in 
glamour stocks because they appear as “prudent” investments and are therefore 
easy to justify to sponsors. Lakonishok et al. (1994) also claim that many investors 
have shorter time horizons than what is required for value strategies, which is 
another reason for preferring glamour strategies over value stocks. 
There are also studies on profitability increasing value performance which makes 
it even harder to explain the anomaly with risk-based explanations. In 2013, 
Novy-Marx discovered that gross profitability improves value portfolios’ 
performance and that value is not driven by unprofitable stocks. He also 
discovered that value and profitability anomalies are negatively correlated. The 
study was done with U.S. data from 1963 to 2010.  
Although the majority of the studies have been conducted with U.S. stock market 
data, there is also clear evidence supporting the value anomaly in Nordic stock 
markets, yet most of the studies have been done with individual stock market 
rather than combination of the markets. Leivo and Pätäri (2009) find that value 
anomaly persists in the Finnish stock market. Davydov, Tikkanen and Äijö (2016) 
find similar results.  
Cakici and Tan (2014) find significant HML factors in Denmark, Finland, Norway 
and Sweden for small capitalization stocks, although only Denmark and Finland 
persisted when only the large stocks are included in the sample.  Kim (2012) 
found significant value premiums in 18 out of 23 developed countries as well as 
in 10 out of 13 emerging countries. The time period was from 1990 to 2010 and 
earnings to price (E/P) was used as the value metric. Out of the Nordic countries 
only Norway had significant value premium. The poor results from the Nordic 
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markets may be at least partially explained by value-weighting the returns. In the 
Nordic markets, there have been cases where one stock has had a massive portion 
of the market capitalization of the total stock market, e.g. Nokia which was more 
than half of the Finnish stock market during the tech bubble. This issue is 
discussed in chapter 7. 
Yet the reason behind the anomaly is still unclear as others support behavioral 
explanations and others risk-based ones. This paper does not try to explain the 
reasons behind the anomaly but to study whether it is possible to improve the 
risk adjusted returns of the value portfolios by combining it with momentum 
metrics.  
6.3. Momentum anomaly 
The basic idea of momentum is to benefit from the stocks that are experiencing a 
positive trend, i.e. momentum. This trend is based on historical share prices and 
the strategy is often referred to as buying winners and selling losers. Based on 
the weak forms of efficiency, past prices should not indicate the future 
movements of the stock prices, even though it is a well-recorded phenomena that 
past winners tend to beat the past losers. This phenomenon is called momentum 
anomaly. The anomaly is well documented and studied and has been proven to 
earn excess returns in many markets. It has existed even to date and have 
persisted even after they have been discovered and researched many times over. 
(Bodie 2011b, 386) 
In 1993, Jegadeesh and Titman showed the momentum anomaly in the U.S. stock 
market between 1965 and 1989, and it is one of the most well-known momentum 
anomaly studies. They studied the performance of selling past losers and buying 
past winners and uncovered significant positive returns for 3 to 12 months 
holding periods. Their evidence claims that the performance of the momentum 
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strategies is not due to their systemic risk. Short-term positive momentum 
followed by long-term negative returns on winners suggest that common 
explanations of return reversals as evidence of overreaction and return 
persistence as evidence of underreaction are most likely oversimplified. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) revisited their study later and discovered that 
momentum anomaly has existed also after their initial time period and pointed 
out that the results were not a product of data mining. They also evaluated 
alternative explanations for the performance of momentum strategies and found 
evidence supporting behavioural explanations, although they note that this 
evidence “should be tempered with caution.” 
There are also studies that link the higher returns achieved with momentum 
strategies to higher risk. Avramov et al. (2007) uncovered a robust link between 
credit ratings and momentum returns. They provide evidence that momentum 
strategies are profitable and significant only among low-grade firms and non-
existent among high-grade ones.  
Pastor & Stambaugh (2003) discovered that illiquid stocks exceed liquid stocks 
returns by 7.5 percent annually even after adjusting for momentum, value and 
size. They also found that half of the momentum returns are related to liquidity 
risk factor during their 34-year period from 1966 to 1999. 
Similarly, Sadka (2006) finds positive correlation between “variable 
(informational) component of liquidity risk when studying individual U.S. 
stocks”. Momentum portfolios generally outperform during positive liquidity 
shocks and consequently underperform during negative ones. Sadka suggests 
that “this supports the hypothesis that the empirically observed premia for 
bearing liquidity risk or information-asymmetry risk is associated with investors’ 
preferences with respect to risk in different states of the world”. 
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Brunnermeier & Pedersen (2009) separate market liquidity from funding 
liquidity. They document that “under certain conditions, margins are 
destabilizing and market liquidity and funding liquidity are mutually 
reinforcing, leading to liquidity spirals”. This implies that traders can be drivers 
of risk premiums and market liquidity.  
Momentum crashes are perhaps one reason investors may feel uncomfortable 
investing with momentum strategy. There are several periods where momentum 
strategies have generated very high losses during a short time period. Barroso & 
Santa-Clara (2015) note that momentum has had the worst crashes out of the most 
common factors (size, value and momentum) and this may cause investors who 
dislike kurtosis and negative skewness to avoid investing with momentum 
strategy. Additionally, they claim that momentum crashes can be predicted with 
a risk management model that doubles the Sharpe compared to regular 
momentum.  
Similarly, results were found by Daniel & Moskowitz (2016), who researched 
momentum crashes also with international equity markets in addition to Barroso 
& Santa-Clara´s (2015) paper. They state that momentum crashes “occur in panic 
states, following market declines and when market volatility is high, and are 
contemporaneous with market rebounds.” Also, they find that momentum 
crashes can be hedged increasing Sharpe ratios and alphas significantly. This 
thesis does not account for any risk-managed momentum strategies but rather 
focuses on the most common momentum and value strategies and their 
combinations.  
Momentum life cycle (MLC) was introduced in 2000 by Lee and Swaminathan. 
They suggest that stocks experience different “cycles” during their lifetime as 
42 
 
 
 
investors “favour and neglect” them from time to time. They find that trading 
volume backs the hypothesis. The MLC is presented in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Momentum life cycle (Lee & Swaminathan, 2000) 
In momentum anomaly, the most commonly used portfolio creation measure is 
12 months’ return excluding the last month. There are also studies that show 
momentum working with different time horizons such as one-month and three-
month momentum. (Jegadeesh & Titman 1993, Chan 2003, Blitz & Viet 2009). The 
anomaly has been present in many markets although majority of the studies have 
focused on U.S. equity markets, although there has been a wide range of studies 
on different regions. (Rouvenhorst 1997, 1999, Asness et al. 2013). This paper 
studies the 12-1 month momentum strategy, hence it is the most widely used in 
the Nordic equity markets.  
Although the majority of the studies have been done in the U.S. stock market 
setting, there is previous research proving the existence of momentum also in the 
Nordic stock markets. Cakici et al. (2014) found a significant WML factor in all 
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Nordic markets except for Sweden, although in Sweden there was a significant 
HML factor with the small capitalization stocks. The study was conducted from 
1991 to 2012.  
Yet the reason behind the anomaly is still unclear as others support behavioral 
explanations and others risk-based ones. This thesis does not try to explain the 
reasons behind the anomaly but to study whether it is possible to improve the 
risk adjusted returns of the momentum portfolios by combining it with value 
metrics.  
6.4. Previous studies in value and momentum combination 
Already in 1997, Asness discovered negative correlation between value and 
momentum. Value was strongest among loser stocks that had experienced low 
momentum, and momentum was strongest in expensive growth stocks that were 
low in value. Similar findings were uncovered by Daniel and Titman (1999). 
Negative correlation among two high-yielding anomalies possibly offers an 
exceptional opportunity to earn high returns with a very stable portfolio with 
little volatility.  
Perhaps the most well-known study when it comes to combining value and 
momentum is Asness et al. (2013) where they studied the correlation and 
performance of value and momentum anomalies as well as the performance of 
combo strategy across eight asset classes and markets. They found significant 
negative correlation between value and momentum, value and momentum 
earning excess returns in all the markets and asset classes except momentum in 
Japan, and especially improved performance of the combined portfolio. They 
note that the negative performance of the momentum in Japan should not be 
viewed in solitude but in the context of value and momentum combination. In 
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the selected time period, value performed exceptionally well in Japan. The study 
used extensive time series from 70s to the 2010s. 
In 2013, Cakici et al. studied the size, value and momentum in 18 emerging 
markets and found strong evidence for value in all the markets and for 
momentum in all the markets excluding Eastern Europe. They also find that 
value and momentum are negatively correlated which is in line with previous 
studies. Their time period started from January 1990 and ended in December 2011 
covering regions from Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe.  
Fisher et al. (2016) studied the portfolio implementation of momentum and value 
anomalies. They studied long-only portfolios in U.S. stock market from 1975 to 
2013 and used several approaches to combine the anomalies to long-only 
portfolios. All of the approaches increased Sharpe ratios in comparison to the 
market both in small and large stocks. Accounting for transaction costs 
supported portfolios which had greater exposure to value than momentum due 
to the slower moving signal and therefore lower turnover. More sophisticated 
combination portfolios outperformed simple 50/50 combination. 
Few of the previous studies have focused on the Nordic stock markets. Leivo 
(2012) found that enhancing value with momentum improves most of the 
traditional value-only portfolios. However, Leivo found that including 
momentum metric into the portfolios increases the asymmetry of return 
distribution in an undesirable manner for investors. The study was done with 
Finnish stock market data from 1993 to 2009.  
In 2004, Bird & Whitaker studied value and momentum anomalies in the major 
European markets. They discovered that value anomaly can be significantly 
improved with a combination of  momentum strategy and that adding dispersion 
to the strategy improves the returns even further, implying that these stocks may 
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be at a turnaround point as some of the analyst have discounted it to the estimates 
while others have not. They also flagged the very poor performance of growth 
and loser stocks. They reason that the findings affirm that many stocks go 
through a cycle similarly as Lee & Swaminathan (2000) suggest. The time period 
was from 1990 to 2002 and the study covered German, French, Italian, Dutch, 
Spanish, Swiss and British stock markets. 
Further in 2007, Bird & Casavecchia studied whether value strategies could be 
enhanced using momentum indicators to time the stock purchases. The study 
was done from 1989 to 2004 with European data but now also smaller countries 
such as Nordic countries were involved, increasing the total number of countries 
to 15. They discovered that value strategies could be enhanced and suggested 
that “due to the difficult nature of forecasting the turnaround of a stock it might 
be just best to react to the sentiment swings.” They also added that analysts are 
more reactive than predictive in their forecasts.  
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7. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In this section, the data and methodologies used in this study are examined. The 
purpose of this chapter is to explain the selected data and methodologies, 
possible caveats and why the data and methodologies have been used.  
7.1. Data 
The data is compiled with OMXH, OMXSPI, OSEBX and OMXC main listed 
companies’ historical returns and financials from January 1991 to December 2017. 
E.g. all stocks that are traded in First North or in other non-main list market 
places are excluded from the sample. Icelandic stock exchange is excluded due 
to the very low amount of stocks, trading volume and especially the size of those 
companies.  This presents the vast majority of the Nordic stock markets but all of 
the stocks cannot be described very liquid, hence many of the stocks are very 
small. The period that portfolios are held starts from January 1993 and ends at 
December 2017. This 25-year period presents the vast majority of the time horizon 
when Nordic stock markets have been large and active enough for large overseas 
investors.  
If a stock is delisted it will be sold at the closing price of its last trading day. If a 
stock has gone bankrupt the return on it will be minus 100 percent. The dividends 
are reinvested to the same stock, eliminating biases arriving from different 
dividend yields between stocks. The total number of stocks in the sample is high, 
over 2000, due to the fact that all of the stocks that have been traded in the period 
are included. This procedure eliminates the survivor bias which would tilt the 
results to be a lot more favorable, especially in a smaller market setting. 
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This unique set of stocks from several countries collected into one basket offers a 
liquid set of securities that can actually be traded. Using Nordic data offers 
valuable contribution to existing academic research. Returns are measured in 
euros and stock returns and market caps from Swedish, Danish and Norwegian 
companies are converted to euros using month-end exchange rates that are 
derived from Bloomberg. This approach gives actual returns that investor would 
have been able to generate, although some of the returns may be driven by 
currency rate changes. Yet, Swedish and Norwegian crowns have been relatively 
stable, and the Danish crown is even tied to euro. This is visible in the Figure 5 
below.  
 
 
Figure 5.  Development of foreign exchange rates 
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Financial companies and stocks that are not primary listed in the Nordic 
exchanges are excluded from the sample, for example if they have primary listing 
in London but have dual listing in Oslo. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of 
the sample. The lowest number of companies in the sample was 543 and highest 
1052. On average, there were 844 stocks in the sample. The large variance in the 
number of companies is explained by the low number of stocks in the early 1990s 
and the rapid development of Nordic stock markets. Sweden is the largest market 
as it accounts for almost half of the average number of companies as well as the 
total market values. Hence Sweden´s part of the results is very significant. The 
total number of stocks and total value are slightly lower after excluding financial 
companies from the sample.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of companies in the sample 
 Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Total 
Max number of 
stocks 
214 150 236 493 1052 
Min number of 
stocks 
133 100 95 164 543 
Number of 
stocks of 
average 
178 126 181 359 844 
Average market 
value in total M€ 
 140 000     137 000     116 000     307 000     700 000    
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The value portfolios are based on their P/B ratios and the momentum portfolios 
are based on their past 52 weeks’ total shareholder return excluding the last 
month. Using total shareholder return instead of simple share price performance 
avoids unnecessary trading created from large dividend payments creating false 
signals as share price should drop the amount of dividend paid. This should not 
have a major impact on the momentum signals but it will avoid repelling stocks 
with high dividend yields. 
As a risk-free rate 6-month interbank offered rate is used. As a risk-free rate an 
average of 6-month Euribor, Stibor, Nibor and Cibor is used. For the periods prior 
Euribor 6-month Helibor is used as a risk-free rate of the Finnish market. This 
method gives the best proxy for a risk-free rate to investor who invest into the 
Nordic stock market. Especially in the early 90s, the markets had higher interest 
rates and therefore higher risk profiles than e.g. U.S. market. Due to this, the 
country average of 6-month interbank offered rate is preferred to U.S. T-Bill that 
has been used in some country basket studies in previous academic research. 
Additionally, a 6-month rate is used instead of a 3-month rate in order to avoid 
months with negative risk-free rates. Using the 6-month rate gives also a slightly 
higher average risk-free rate than using the 3-month rate.  
In Figure 6, it is visible that the Nordic IBOR-rates have been higher compared to 
the U.S. T-Bill, with the exception of the most recent years and the years coming 
to the financial crisis. It is also noteworthy that the Nordic rates are highly 
positively correlated with the exception of Norway which has its own special 
circumstances due to the impact of oil price, although it does not differ from the 
other rates significantly. From these IBOR-rates, an average is formed which is 
used as a risk-free rate in this study. 
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Figure 6. Nordic IBOR-rate and U.S. T-Bill development 
Price-to-book ratios are calculated as the latest share price divided by the last 
year’s actual reported book value per share. The book values are considered to 
be from last year on the first of July in order to avoid ahead look bias. Share price 
data, risk-free rates, stock index returns, foreign exchange rates, market caps and 
price-to-book ratios are derived from Bloomberg database.  
The investment horizon is from 1993 to 2017, lasting 25 years. This time period 
includes several market cycles and sentiments offering a comprehensive dataset 
for research. During the period, the Nordic stock markets have evolved and 
grown in size as well as experienced turmoil from the tech bubble in the turn of 
the century to the financial crisis in the late 2000s, as well as countries having 
endured their own banking crises.  
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In the final data sample from which the combination portfolios are created the 
portfolios hold only the top third of the largest stocks by market capitalization. 
This leads to a dataset where the smallest stock in the sample is 65 M€ in market 
capitalization and on average all companies are above 175 M€ in market 
capitalization. This leads to a liquid set of securities, although there may be some 
short sales constraints in medium-sized stocks. This matter is being discussed 
throughout this and next chapter where results are presented.  
7.2. Methodology 
When creating portfolios, the aforementioned parameters are used in creating the 
value and momentum portfolios. Top and bottom thirds are used as limits for 
value and growth as well as winners and losers -portfolios. The portfolios are 
then adjusted monthly to hold the winners and losers at all times. The same 
procedure is applied to value portfolios as well, although in many previous 
studies these portfolios are not adjusted as often. This procedure is used in order 
to have better comparability between all the portfolios when moving into 
creating combination portfolios and comparing them with each other, as well as 
with the pure play value and momentum portfolios. 
In a similar manner to risk-free rates, a combined market index is created using 
all-share indexes from OMX Helsinki, Stockholm, Oslo and Copenhagen. The 
returns are total shareholder returns where dividends have been reinvested in a 
similar manner as in portfolios created in this study. The returns of individual 
country indexes are additionally value-weighted to avoid bias from having a too 
high portion of the returns from smaller countries. It is important to note that the 
index will have returns also from the smaller stocks, hence creating larger returns 
compared to an index compiled from only the largest stocks in the market. This 
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conservative method creates a larger hurdle to surpass for the portfolios created 
in this study.  
Portfolio performance is measured with Sharpe ratio and Sortino ratio. Also, 
absolute returns are presented and compared as well as risk-adjusted returns 
measured by Capital Asset Pricing Model. The performance of the formed value 
and momentum combination portfolios are compared to the combined index as 
well as simple separate value and momentum portfolios form the same time 
period.  
In addition to pure play value and momentum portfolios, several types of value 
and momentum combination portfolios are created: 
(1) 50/50: half of the portfolio on momentum and other half on value strategy 
(2) Double screening: stocks that indicate both value and momentum signals 
(in the top 50% in both for long and bottom 50% for both for short) 
(3) Ranking scheme: rank stocks based on value and momentum and take the 
average of the scores (long for top third and short for lowest third) 
Every portfolio will be constructed with long-only and long-short approach, so 
the number of portfolios will be treble to the strategies presented above plus the 
pure-play value and momentum portfolios. Long-only is studied conservatively 
due to the fact that some of the stocks are relatively small in size and can have 
some restrictions to short selling. 
In order to account for size bias, portfolios are also created with stocks that are in 
the top third of the sample measured by market capitalization in euros. The large 
cap tiers are also adjusted monthly so if a stock has been in the portfolio but the 
share price declines, it may be sold if the drop-in share price causes the stock to 
fall below the top third in market capitalization. This procedure offers an even 
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more liquid set of securities reducing short-sales constraints and transaction costs 
compared to small cap stocks. Additionally, returns are then value-weighted 
creating an extremely liquid set of returns and leaving very little room for short 
sales constraints, high trading costs or non-viable trades. Value-weighting 
supports additionally momentum and diminishes value. Value-weighted returns 
are not presented due to very large stocks causing massive bias. 
Instead, equal-weighted returns are presented due to the fact that in the Nordic 
stock markets there are not that many very large companies and their returns will 
dominate the value weighted returns.  For example, in the early 2000s, Nokia´s 
market cap was more than 25% of the total market value of all stocks in the 
Nordic stock market. This creates several situations where one stock’s weight is 
more than half of the portfolio, i.e. that the portfolio’s performance would be 
almost solely driven by one stock. Hence the primary focus is in the equal-
weighted returns because it provides the best picture of the returns that could 
have been actually achieved. Similarly, equal-weighted returns have been used 
in other Nordic stock market research (Äijö et al. 2016, Leivo et al. 2009, 2012).  
When moving into comparing the best combination strategies, only larger stocks 
are included in the universe. In pure-play value and momentum portfolios also 
smaller stocks are included to show the effect that size has to value and 
momentum strategies. The conservative approach of using only the large stock is 
then applied when studying the best-in-class value and momentum 
combinations.  
To adjust for possible autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, Newey-west 
covariance estimator is used. The t-statistics are presented along with monthly 
returns and monthly alphas of the portfolios in the next chapter. Also Sharpe and 
Sortino ratios are presented, as well as portfolio betas and standard deviations.    
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8. RESULTS 
Firstly, it is expected that value and momentum anomalies exist like they have in 
several studies before. Secondly, it is expected that the combination of the two 
strategies outperform value-only and momentum-only strategies. Yet it is 
unclear which of the strategies to combine the anomalies will produce the highest 
risk-adjusted returns. All of the portfolios are also expected to beat the market 
measured by combination of country indexes.  
In this section results of the momentum, value and combination portfolios are 
represented. The pure-play value and momentum portfolios are represented in 
both, including all stocks and having only the top third of the largest stocks. The 
combination portfolios are presented only from the data that includes the top 
third largest stocks. This eliminates size bias and describes that there are 
significant differences in returns if small stocks are included compared to a more 
realistic situation where small stocks are not included in the sample.  
Figures presented in this chapter describe portfolio returns over risk-free returns. 
Monthly returns in tables are raw returns, i.e. risk-free returns are not deducted 
from the returns. T-statistics are presented in parenthesis in the tables. 
8.1. Pure-play momentum 
Momentum anomaly offered significant excess returns in the Nordic stock 
market during the period. Although momentum performed well, the strategy 
suffered some crashes during the period, as has been identified by the previous 
research. (Barroso et al. 2015, Daniel et al. 2016) Part of the returns diminish after 
accounting for size but momentum remains to deliver significant excess returns 
even when using only the largest and most liquid stocks. 
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Excluding financial companies from the sample reduces returns slightly as well 
but has no significant effect to the results as momentum strategy offers excess 
returns with or without investing in financials. Financial companies are excluded 
from the sample due to the fact that then returns are more comparable to different 
value and value momentum combination strategies. Returns of momentum 
strategies including financial stocks are not presented in the paper but it is 
noteworthy that excluding them does not have a material effect on the returns. 
Winners minus losers -portfolios offer highly significant results with high t- 
statistics in both all-stocks and large stocks. The results are significant at 5% level 
in all-stocks portfolio and have even higher significance levels at large-cap 
portfolio. The very high returns in all-stocks portfolios are somewhat diminished 
by extremely high standard deviations. Sharpe ratio even increases in large-stock 
portfolios compared to all-stocks, although it delivers lower alpha and Sortino 
ratio. This is due to the very high volatility of the all-stocks momentum portfolio. 
Hence Sortino ratio does not account for the upside risk so it does not increase 
moving into large-stocks only portfolio.  
 
Table 2. Results of momentum strategy 
All stocks equally weighted 
 Winners Losers Winners minus losers 
Monthly return 2,47 % (3,56) 0,75 % (1,54) 1,72 % (2,93) 
Monthly alpha 1,74 % (2,54) -0,28 % (-1,11) 2,01 % (2,99) 
STDEV 38,5 % 21,7 % 37,5 % 
Sharpe ratio 0,77 0,27 0,61 
Sortino ratio 12,42 1,67 8,89 
Portfolio beta 0,63 0,88 -0,25 
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Top third equally weighted 
 Winners Losers Winners minus losers 
Monthly return  1,95 % (4,61)    1,10 % (2,61) 0,86 % (3,57) 
Monthly alpha 0,92 % (4,46) -0,01 % (-0,06) 0,93 % (4,21) 
STDEV 19,0 % 20,2 % 13,3 % 
Sharpe ratio 1,16    0,51 0,81 
Sortino ratio 7,34 3,02 4,72 
Portfolio beta 0,89 0,95 -0,06 
 
Momentum strategy is tilted towards growth as on average the P/B ratio of the 
winners-portfolio is 7,2 and for the losers-portfolio it is only 3,7 in the top third 
portfolio. In the all-stocks portfolio the difference is even larger as the winners-
portfolio has over triple the P/B ratios of the losers-portfolio, although now the 
ratios are a lot lower, winners having 2,1 and losers having 0,7 on average.  
8.2. Pure-play value 
Value anomaly offered excess returns from the 1990s to 2017 in the Nordic stock 
market when small stocks were a part of the portfolio but after accounting for 
size the returns were significantly lower. In the whole sample value anomaly 
yielded impressive returns but it suffered long periods of low returns that can be 
one of the reasons why investors avoid value strategies. (Lakonishok et al. 1994) 
Value anomaly seems to be driven partially by small stocks as equally weighted 
returns of the whole sample offer significantly higher returns compared to the 
universe of stocks that are in the top third by market capitalization. Large value 
stocks experienced poor performance coming to the tech bubble but since that 
have delivered excess returns.  
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Value minus growth portfolios created significant excess returns in both all- and 
large-stocks portfolios. The Sharpe ratio declines significantly from 1,11 to 0,44 
when only the largest stocks are included, indicating that small value stocks are 
driving the anomaly at least to some extent but are not the sole reason. Both 
results are statistically significant at 5 % level.  
 
Table 3. Results of value strategy 
All stocks equally weighted 
 Value Growth Value minus growth 
Monthly return  2,05 % (4,30) 0,80 % (1,71) 1,25 % (4,12) 
Monthly alpha 1,16 % (4,02) -0,23 % (-0,99) 1,39 % (4,95) 
STDEV 20,9 % 19,5 % 14,5 % 
Sharpe ratio 1,12 0,33 1,11 
Sortino ratio 9,17 1,85 9,87 
Portfolio beta 0,76 0,88 -0,12 
 
Top third equally weighted 
 Value Growth Value minus growth 
Monthly return  1,50 % (3,69)  1,06 % (2,28) 0,44 % (1,50)  
Monthly alpha 0,49% (2,05) -0,08 % (-0,41) 0,58 % (2,08) 
STDEV 18,5 % 20,3 % 12,2 % 
Sharpe ratio 0,85 0,48 0,44 
Sortino ratio 5,11 2,70 2,49 
Portfolio beta 0,86 0,98 -0,12 
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8.3. 50/50 value and momentum portfolio 
The value-growth and winners-losers portfolios of the top third largest 
companies are very highly negatively correlated. This is consistent with previous 
studies and offers clear diversification benefits between value and momentum. 
Negative correlation prevents large crashes in the portfolio that pure-play 
momentum experiences from time to time. Both are also negatively correlated to 
index, value providing larger negative correlation. Correlation matrix is 
presented in Table 4.  
 
Table 4. Correlation matrix of value and momentum portfolios and index 
  Value Growth Winners Losers 
Value -
growth 
Winners - 
losers Index 
Value 1,000             
Growth 0,807 1,000           
Winners 0,829 0,938 1,000         
Losers 0,927 0,846 0,771 1,000       
Value-growth 0,175 -0,441 -0,303 -0,002 1,000     
Winners - losers -0,220 0,057 0,260 -0,415 -0,430 1,000   
Index 0,852 0,885 0,858 0,863 -0,181 -0,083 1,000 
 
Using a very simple 50/50 allocation between the aforementioned value and 
momentum increases Sharpe ratios significantly as negative correlation between 
the strategies reduces standard deviation. The results are in line with previous 
studies (Assnes et. al 2013). In Figure 7, it visible how a simple 50/50 combination 
improves the portfolio as the development of the portfolio is an almost straight 
diagonal line to northeast while momentum experiences significant downturns 
and value suffers from long periods with extremely low or even negative returns. 
The 50/50 combination clearly adds value as Sharpe and Sortino ratios improve 
significantly compared to pure-play strategies that are presented in Table 5. The 
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improvement of Sharpe ratios gives strong additional evidence that the 
combination of value and momentum creates pervasive and significant excess 
returns while reducing risk compared to individual value or momentum 
strategies. The weak returns of value strategy should not be looked in solitude 
but rather in combination with momentum. The weak value returns are more 
than compensated with high momentum returns. The results are similar to 
Assnes et al. (2013) in Japanese stock market though the roles between the hero 
and zero are reversed.   
 
Table 5. Results of value, momentum and 50/50 portfolios 
All stocks equally weighted 
 Value minus growth Winners minus losers 50/50 
Monthly return 1,25 % (4,12) 1,72 % (2,93) 1,48 % (4,79)   
Monthly alpha 1,39 % (4,95) 2,01 % (2,99) 1,70 % (4,73) 
STDEV 14,5 % 37,5 % 19,3 % 
Sharpe ratio 1,11 0,61 1,00 
Sortino ratio 9,87 8,89 23,82 
Portfolio beta -0,12 -0,25 
 
-0,18 
 
Top third equally weighted 
 Value minus growth Winners minus losers 50/50 
Monthly return 0,44 % (1,50)  0,86 % (3,57) 0,65 % (4,94)   
Monthly alpha 0,58 % (2,08) 0,93 % (4,21) 0,75 % (4,78) 
STDEV 12,2 % 13,3 % 6,8 % 
Sharpe ratio 0,44 0,81 1,18 
Sortino ratio 2,49 4,72 9,35 
Portfolio beta -0,12 -0,06 -0,09 
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The results of 50/50 portfolios are statistically significant at 1% level. The t-
statistics are higher than in either value or momentum portfolios. Especially 
compared to value portfolio the t-statistics are well above. The very low standard 
deviation of 50/50 portfolio increases Sharpe ratios significantly even though the 
raw returns are below momentum portfolio´s returns.  
For the period after tech bubble at the turn of the century the roles of the value 
and momentum performance have changed. Value reports higher returns than 
momentum due to the performance after the bubble burst. The 50/50 combo 
continues to increase Sharpe ratio. Once again the 50/50 portfolio is an almost 
straight diagonal line to northeast. The portfolio performances from the turn of 
the century are presented in Figure 8.  
 
 
Figure 7. Value, momentum and 50/50 portfolios (top third equal weighted) 
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Figure 8. Value, momentum and 50/50 portfolios post tech bubble (top third 
equal weighted) 
 
8.4. Double screening for value and momentum 
Now only the top third of the market capitalization is used in order to exclude 
too small stocks that are not liquid enough or might have short sales constraints. 
Now the value and momentum limits are set to 50% in order to have enough 
stocks in the portfolios at all times as stocks must have both value and 
momentum signals to be included to the portfolio, i.e. stocks are sorted based on 
momentum and value in the whole sample, not firstly sorted based on value and 
then in momentum within the value stocks. 
Lowering the limits somewhat increases the returns but additionally increases 
standard deviations. The results of the 50%-limits portfolios are presented in 
Table 6. and 33%-limits portfolios are presented in Table 7. In further 
comparisons the 50%-limits portfolio is used due to the aforementioned issues. 
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Combining value and momentum metrics into one portfolio increases returns 
significantly. Value and winner portfolio creates extremely high average returns, 
although with high standard deviation implying that some of the diversification 
benefits from negative correlation between pure play value and momentum are 
lost. Surprisingly, growth and winners create even higher returns, although very 
slightly, implying that momentum is the driver of excess returns. Even more 
unexpectedly the returns of the two aforementioned portfolios are very highly 
correlated throughout the period, although growth and winners experience 
slightly higher volatility leading value and winners to be the best performing 
portfolio with highest Sharpe ratio. This is visible in Figure 9. and presented in 
Table 6. 
Value and losers -portfolio creates also excess returns but not as significant that 
value and winners -portfolio. This is constant with the results from previous 
studies that adding momentum to value metrics can enhance returns (Leivo 
2012).  
The most significant finding is the extremely poor performance of growth and 
losers -portfolio. It yields even lower returns than the risk-free rate in the period. 
This offers great short sales opportunity and the possibility to create zero cost 
portfolios. As only the largest stocks are used, execution of the strategy is viable. 
The finding is consistent with Lee & Swaminathan (2000) who suggest that 
momentum experiences different cycles. Similar results were also found by Bird 
& Whitaker in 2004 in major European stock markets from 1990 to 2002. On the 
contrary to this study, they found that the most prolific long play would have 
been value and losers rather than value and winners.  
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Thus a long–short portfolio is a portfolio that is long in value and winners and 
short on the opposite side, i.e. growth and losers. If there were short sales 
constraints it would lower the returns.  
 
Table 6. Results of long-only combination portfolios (50% limits) 
Top third equal weighted 
 Value and 
winners 
Value and 
losers 
Growth and 
winners 
Growth and 
losers 
Monthly 
return 
1,66 % (3,95) 1,22 % (2,97) 1,68 % (3,69) 0,25 % (0,56) 
Monthly 
alpha 
0,72 % (2,56) 0,18 % (0,89) 0,61 % (2,98) -0,88 % (-4,18) 
STDEV 18,2 % 19,2 % 19,7 % 20,6 % 
Sharpe ratio 0,99    0,62    0,92    -0,01    
Sortino ratio 5,80 3,79 5,74 -0,07 
Portfolio beta 0,81 0,89 0,92 0,97 
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Figure 9. Cumulative returns of combination portfolios and market equal 
weighted 
 
The best-performing value and winners -portfolio offers statistically significant 
returns and alpha at 1% significance level. Value and losers seems to be highly 
correlated with the market, so it fails to create significant alpha. Growth and 
winners delivers significant alpha and returns, as well, but it has higher volatility 
compared to value and winners, so it delivers lower Sharpe ratio and slightly 
lower Sortino ratio. Growth and losers creates statistically highly significant very 
negative alpha.  
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Table 7. Results of long-only combination portfolios (33% limits) 
Top third equal weighted 
 Value and 
winners 
Value and 
losers 
Growth and 
winners 
Growth and 
losers 
Monthly 
return 
 1,83 % (3,72) 1,29 % (2,93) 1,97 % (3,87) -0,13 % (-0,28) 
Monthly 
alpha 
0,84 % (2,38) 1,12 % (2,55) 1,72 % (3,56) -0,40 % (-0,89) 
STDEV 20,9 % 21,3 % 21,9 % 23,2 % 
Sharpe ratio 0,97 0,61 1,02 -0,21  
Sortino ratio 5,90 3,86 6,51 -1,08 
Portfolio beta 0,85 0,15 0,22 0,24 
 
When using 33% limits, the trends are similar as in 50% limits, although now 
growth and winners delivers the highest Sharpe ratio. Growth and losers creates 
now even negative returns, although the results are not statistically significant. 
These portfolios are more volatile; hence they hold less securities than the 
portfolios constructed with 50% limits. This is presented in Table 8 below. When 
using 33% limits, portfolios end up holding very few stocks at worst. Value and 
winners -portfolio even has periods when zero stocks are held. On average using 
50% limits at least doubles the number of stocks in portfolios compared to using 
33% limits.  
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Table 8. Number of stocks in portfolio 
 Value and 
winners 
Value and 
losers 
Growth and 
winners 
Growth and 
losers 
Average 33 %  17 31 33 20 
Max 33 % 37 55 57 40 
Min 33 % 0 9 8 2 
Average 50 %  47 65 64 48 
Max 50 % 74 102 106 78 
Min 50 % 13 20 20 14 
 
Based on these results investors who are eager to invest in growth companies 
should include momentum metrics in their investment criteria as it increases the 
returns of growth stocks dramatically. The poor performance of the growth 
stocks seems to be at least partly explained by the extremely weak performance 
of loser stocks. Investing into growth and loser stocks should be avoided. 
8.5. Average ranking method 
Average ranking method ranks stocks from 1 to 0 based on their ranking in price 
to book and 12-1M returns compared to the other stocks. Lowest price to book 
ratio (highest value) gets 1 and highest (lowest value) gets 0 and the stock in the 
middle gets 0,5 as ranking score. Similarly, highest 12-1M return gets the score of 
1 and lowest gets 0. Then these to ranks are added together and based on that 
score the top third of the companies creates a long portfolio (high rank) and 
lowest third creates a short portfolio (low rank).  
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This procedure allows stocks to be part of the portfolio even if they do not have 
both signals but are high in another. It may also include stocks that are neither 
value nor momentum but are almost in both. This is a similar procedure as in 
Fisher et al. (2016) with the exception that also a short portfolio is created. This 
has some benefits compared to double screening as it lowers the portfolio 
turnover, hence it is not solely driven by momentum. Additionally, it allows a 
stock to be part of the portfolio even if it fails to be high in both momentum and 
value if it is very strong in the other. 
Average ranking value and momentum signals yields significant excess returns. 
After accounting for size by using only the top third largest stocks it offers 
extremely high returns and Sharpe ratios. The exceptionally high returns from 
an equally weighted high–low portfolio may not be as high in real life with 
trading cost and especially if there are short sales restrictions, as significant 
portion of returns is driven by the very weak performance of a low-rank 
portfolio. The average monthly return of the low-rank portfolio is even lower 
than the risk-free return in the period. If there are many stocks that cannot be 
sold short the returns would decrease significantly, although a long-short 
portfolio of a high-rank market would have also produced significant returns, so 
the excellent performance of the ranking scheme cannot be explained by short 
sales constraints as the long part of the portfolio offered very high returns. 
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Table 9. Results of ranking method portfolios 
Top third equally weighted 
 High rank Low rank High - low 
Monthly return 1,85 % (4,84) 0,25 % (0,56) 1,60 % (7,01) 
Monthly alpha 0,90 % (4,12) -0,88 % (-4,18) 1,79 % (6,87) 
STDEV 17,4 % 20,6 % 11,6 % 
Sharpe ratio 1,18 -0,02 1,81    
Sortino ratio 7,35 -0,08 16,44 
Portfolio beta 0,81 0,97 -0,17 
 
High-rank portfolio creates extremely high raw returns and alpha, both being 
significant at 1% level. Same applies to the long-short portfolio which creates 
even higher alpha as well as Sharpe and Sortino ratio. Partially this is driven by 
the weak performance of low-rank portfolio which creates very negative alpha 
with 1% significance level. It should be noted that even if there would be some 
short sales constraints it would not diminish returns hence the long portfolio 
creates very high returns. Additionally, growth stocks are on average larger in 
size than value stocks, and including only the largest third of the stocks in the 
portfolio decreases the probability of constraints significantly. This is visible in 
Figure 10. 
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Figure 10. Returns of ranking scheme portfolios 
 
Fisher et al. (2016) also found that the average ranking method decreases 
portfolio turnover compared to momentum portfolio and therefore trading costs 
significantly, although it has a higher turnover compared to the 50/50 portfolio 
that benefits from the very low turnover of a value portfolio. Using thresholds in 
trading as done by Fisher et al. (2016) would decrease the portfolio turnover even 
more.  
8.6. Comparing the best-in-class value and momentum long-short portfolios 
Value and winners minus growth and losers would be the natural long-short 
portfolio which combines value and momentum. It also generates higher raw 
returns compared to the 50/50 portfolio and increases partially driven by the 
Sharpe ratio even if it has a higher standard deviation implying that some of the 
diversification benefits from the negative correlation between value and 
momentum are lost. 
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Same story applies to ranking a scheme-based portfolio. The ranking scheme -
based portfolio created extremely high raw returns and Sharpe ratios compared 
to any other portfolio in this study, although some of these returns may not have 
been achievable if there had been significant short sales restrictions in medium-
sized stocks. Compared to value and winners minus growth and losers -portfolio, 
there is even reduction in standard deviation as well as higher raw returns 
leading to significant improvement in Sharpe ratio. The results are presented in 
Table 10. as well as visually demonstrated in Figure 11.  
 
Table 10. Results of best-in-class value and momentum portfolios 
Top third equal weighted 
 Value and winners – 
growth and losers 
High rank – low rank 50/50 
Monthly return 1,41 % (5,35) 1,60 % (7,01) 0,65 % (4,94)   
Monthly alpha 1,60 % (5,11) 1,79 % (6,87) 0,75 % (4,78) 
STDEV 12,5 % 11,6 % 8,0 % 
Sharpe ratio 1,48    1,81    1,18    
Sortino ratio 11,69 16,44 9,37 
Portfolio beta -0,16 -0,17 -0,09 
 
Considering transaction costs would decrease the returns of portfolios with 
higher exposure to momentum more than the portfolios with higher exposure to 
slow moving value. Fisher et al. (2016) found that ranking scheme -based 
portfolios have a slightly higher turnover than the 50/50 portfolio and naturally 
momentum portfolios had the highest turnover and value portfolios had the 
lowest turnover. Value and winners minus growth and losers should have the 
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highest turnover of the aforementioned combo portfolios as it is a momentum 
portfolio even though it also sorted on a value metric. The stock can be bought 
only if both signals are positive but will be sold even if the other turns negative 
in the portfolio. This supports additionally the 50/50 portfolio and somewhat the 
ranking scheme -based portfolio.  
All in all, the ranking scheme -based long–short portfolio seems to be superior. It 
creates very high raw returns, alpha, Sharpe and Sortino ratio while having fairly 
low standard deviation and negative beta. The results have also the highest t-
statistics of the portfolios, being significant at 1% level. 
 
 
Figure 11. Cumulative returns of equal weighted top third portfolios  
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Table 11.  Correlation matrix of best-in-class combination portfolios and index 
  
High rank - 
low rank 50/50 
Value and winners - 
growth and losers Index 
High rank - low rank 1,00    
50/50 0,90 1,00   
Value and winners - growth 
and losers 0,94 0,89 1,00  
Index -0,26 -0,24 -0,24 1,00 
 
In Table 10, correlations of the portfolios’ returns over risk-free rates are 
presented. All of the portfolios are negatively correlated to the index but are 
highly positively correlated with each other.  
8.7. Comparing the best-in-class value and momentum long-only portfolios 
If there are significant short sales constraints or costs in the market, the best 
performing combination portfolios might not offer such outstanding returns, 
hence a large portion of their performance is driven by the short sale side. To 
offer a view of the possible effect of the restrictions, long-only returns are 
presented in Table 11 and Figure 12.  
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Table 12. Results of best-in-class long-only value and momentum portfolios 
Top third equal weighted 
 Value and 
winners 
High rank Winners 50/50 Market 
Monthly 
return 
1,66 % (3,95) 1,85 % (4,84) 1,95 % (4,61)    1,72 % (4,33) 1,17 % (3,18) 
Monthly 
alpha 
0,72 % (2,56) 0,90 % (4,12) 0,92 % (4,46) 0,71 % (3,53)  
STDEV 18,2 % 17,4 % 19,0 % 18,0 % 18,3 % 
Sharpe ratio 0,99    1,18    1,16    1,05    0,62 
Sortino ratio 5,80 7,35 7,34 6,38 5,86 
Portfolio beta 0,81 0,81 0,89 0,87 1,00 
 
 
Figure 12. Cumulative returns of long-only equal weighted top third portfolios  
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All of the portfolios created statistically significant returns and alphas at 1% 
significance level except for value and winners -portfolio whose alpha was at 5% 
significance level.  
Now high rank increases the Sharpe ratio of a momentum portfolio only slightly, 
although it is noteworthy that accounting for transaction costs would lower the 
winners -portfolios’ returns significantly more compared to the high rank and 
50/50 portfolio. Hence, ranking scheme still holds as the best-performing value 
and momentum metric. All of the portfolios beat the index clearly. The turnovers 
of different value and momentum portfolios by Fisher et al. (2016) are presented 
in Table 12. All of the portfolios beat the market clearly in both raw returns and 
Sharpe ratios. All of the portfolios also created significant alpha. 
 
Table 13. Turnovers of value and momentum and combination portfolios (Fisher 
et al. 2016) 
Strategy Buy Sell Turnover (small cap) Turnover (large cap) 
Value 90 70 31 % 26 % 
Value 95 65 25 % 20 % 
Momentum 90 70 118 % 157 % 
Momentum 95 65 104 % 133 % 
0.5V + 0.5M 90 70 75 %  91 % 
0.5V + 0.5M 95 65 64 % 76 % 
Avg. V/M 90 70 89 % 103 % 
Avg. V/M 95 65 62 % 75 % 
 
Momentum clearly has the highest turnover with both buy and sell thresholds 
and value the lowest which is in line with the common belief that value is a fast-
moving signal and momentum a slow-moving one. The 50/50 combo has 
significantly lower turnover than momentum and average ranking scheme -
based portfolio has higher turnover than the 50/50 combo. Increasing the 
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thresholds lowers portfolio turnover and decreases average-ranking portfolios’ 
turnover below the 50/50 combo. These sort of thresholds are not used in this 
paper as it is assumed that an average-ranking portfolio has a slightly higher 
turnover than the 50/50 combo and that momentum has clearly the highest. It is 
also important to note that these are long-only turnovers but the relationship 
between different strategies can still be compared.   
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9. CONCLUSIONS 
Momentum strategy yields significant excess returns in the Nordic stock market 
that cannot be explained by size. The yields of the value strategy offer significant 
excess returns but after accounting for size those returns decrease, implying that 
value premium is partly but not fully driven by size effect in the Nordic stock 
market.  
Combining value and momentum increases Sharpe ratios and offers investors 
significant diversification benefits in the Nordic stock markets which is in line 
with previous studies (Asness et al. 2013, Fisher et al. 2016). All of the 
combination portfolios improved Sharpe ratios of pure-play momentum and 
pure-play value. The combination of value and momentum into a single portfolio 
can improve a simple 50/50 combination significantly. The ranking scheme -
based portfolio offered the best performance. All of the combination portfolios 
also had higher raw returns than pure play value and momentum except for 
50/50 portfolio, though it had higher than pure play Sharpe ratios due to very 
low volatility. 
The smaller stocks investors can buy and sell short, the more it supports value 
portfolios, hence value is largely driven by small stocks. Almost all of the 
portfolios that have more exposure to value have higher risk-adjusted returns 
than when small stocks are included. These returns may not be viable for state 
pension funds or a several-billion-dollar U.S. based hedge fund but could be 
viable to achieve for medium sized Nordic mutual funds. 
This paper studied several different metrics to combine value and momentum in 
a long-short portfolio. The best risk-adjusted returns were achieved with the 
ranking scheme approach. All of the combination portfolios were able to increase 
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the very high Sharpe ratio of simple value and momentum portfolio. The increase 
in Sharpe ratio was clearly driven by the very low standard deviation caused by 
negative correlation between value and momentum in the case of the 50/50 
portfolio. Other value and momentum combination portfolios seemed to 
somewhat lack the ability to decrease volatility compared to the 50/50 portfolio, 
even though all of them had lower standard deviations than a simple momentum 
portfolio. The increase of Sharpe ratios with a ranking scheme -based portfolio 
and a double-sorted portfolio that were compared to the 50/50 portfolio were 
solely driven by higher raw returns.  
Only simple combination methods and the most common value and momentum 
measures were used in order to avoid data mining. These are far from the only 
possible ways to combine value and momentum. Further research could be done 
with additional momentum metrics, such as 3-month and 1-month, additional 
value metrics, such as PE or EV/EBIT ratios, or even more exotic ways to combine 
the metrics. Additionally, analyst forecasts, profitability or asset growth could be 
analysed to better understand the anomalies.  
This paper does not consider trading costs but rather focuses on the highest gross 
returns within liquid set of securities, although it is noted based on previous 
research that momentum experiences higher transaction costs than value. 
Additional research could be done with estimating trading costs for the 
portfolios, e.g. based on the actual spreads for each specific stock at the given 
date. This might support portfolios with higher exposure to value metric, hence 
it is a lot slower-moving signal compared to momentum. Also, the scope of the 
research could be broadened to other markets and time periods.  
Neither does this paper account for the fact that some sophisticated momentum 
strategies, such as risk-managed momentum, could increase Sharpe ratios of 
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simple momentum strategies by avoiding momentum crashes. Same applies for 
value as no other than the traditional P/B anomaly is researched. Additional 
research could be done by researching whether risk-adjusted momentum and 
best-in class value strategies could be combined in a way that increases the 
Sharpe ratio of the aforementioned strategies. Additionally, trading volume 
could be used to identify better trading strategies when combining value and 
momentum. 
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